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The Role of Judges and Legal Scholars
Jan-14-06 08:02 pm

In the wake of  Judge Samuel Alito's confirmation hearings, there has been much discussion of the role of a judge. I think Steve Bainbridge succinctly gives the best answer:

I think judges have no right to impose their own personal policy preferences. Instead, judges are on the bench to enforce the rule of law. Supreme Court Justice Harlan made this point quite well when he criticized what he called "a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional ‘principle,’ and that this Court should ‘take the lead’ in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act” (Reynolds v. Sims 1964, 624).

Whether the judge in question is a Supreme Court justice, a state judge, or a member of the International Court of Justice, his or her role is to "say what the law is." Of course, there can be tremendous disagreement about "what the law is," but that is what a judge must seek to determine.

In a similar vein, I think legal scholars often get their roles confused. While a legal scholar can certainly make recommendations about what the law should be, those recommendations should never be done under the guise of saying what the law is. I worry about international legal scholars in particular, because unlike in much of domestic law, there is no stare decisis in international law, and state practice can often be difficult to assess. There is clearly a temptation to say that a rule of customary international law exists because one wants it do exist, rather than because the putative rule is truly controlling (reflected in state practice) and authoritative (believed by states to be the law).

About the editor:

Anthony Clark Arend

Professor

Commentary and analysis at the intersection of international law and politics.

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» Learn more about the M.A. in International Law and Government at Georgetown University.


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