The previous post discussed the case of Majid Khan-- a case in which the US government is seeking to obtain a court ruling prohibiting him from disclosing the details of the methods of interrogation used against him. Marty Lederman over at Balkinization shares my concern about the lack of any legal basis for such a request:

As DOJ sees it, Khan can't have a lawyer because of the risk that he'll tell the lawyer about that classified info that he now "possesses."

This argument apparently presumes -- is fundamentally predicated on the notion -- that we could lawfully prevent Khan from announcing to the world the manner in which the U.S. Government has treated him. But is that right?

Of course, the CIA, like other intelligence agencies the world over, is legally authorized to do certain nasty things to people outside our borders. And our intelligence agencies in fact do many things to such people that go close to or over the legal limits. There is ususally very good reason for keeping secret the CIA's tactics and methods. And as a general rule, it makes perfect sense that the agency's sources and methods are presumptively classified under U.S. law. Thus, if the CIA lets you in on those secrets -- say, because you are employed by the agency, or you are a Senator overseeing the agency, or a judge adjudicating a dispute -- it can ordinarily condition your access on a promise that you won't publicly reveal the secrets. (See generally Snepp.) (I remain unconvinced that it is necessary to classify the legal limits on the CIA's interrogation techniques. But for the purposes of this post, I'll assume that there are valid reasons to classify certain information about what the CIA has actually done in particular cases -- an assumption that in turn depends in part on the contested assumption that the CIA's actions were lawful.)

But even if the classification itself were valid, can it really be the case that the persons against whom the CIA employed its methods may be prevented from disclosing such historical facts to the public? Indeed, at least to the extent that their audience includes the U.S. public, I would assume that the victims of U.S. government actions have a First Amendment right to publish the story, even if they are aliens abroad (see Lamont). (Perhaps there's a Sixth Amendment right to counsel implicated, too, but I'm less interested in that just now.)

So, for example, if and when Khan is released from U.S. custody, he will be free to publicly describe his treatment at the hands of the CIA -- even though a CIA employee, or Senator overseeing the agency, might not be likewise free to do so. Indeed, several CIA detainees have publicly told the stories of their detention and interrogation, including the book-length treatment by Moazzam Begg and the declaration, in the Khan case itself, of Khaled al-Masri, who was held with Khan in the "Salt Pit." We could not detain Khan because he threatened to reveal what the CIA did to him -- that would be an impermissible prior restraint. Therefore, even if Khan is legally detained for other, valid reasons, it seems to me that we cannot use the fact -- the fortuity -- of his detention as an excuse for preventing his public speech that would otherwise be constitutionally privileged.

Am I missing something? Are there other cases in which a government has been permitted to restrict, say, inmate speech because of a risk that the inmate will reveal classified information about the way in which he has been treated by the state? Has the issue ever even been addressed in court cases? Thanks in advance for any insights.

I don't think you're missing anything.