Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding

by Shireen Hunter

Amid rising tensions with the West over its nuclear program, Iran is preparing for parliamentary elections to be held in March 2008. These elections are significant form several perspectives. First, these elections are widely viewed as a judgment on the performance of President Ahmadinejad’s government, as well its conduct of Iran’s external relations. Ahmadinejad came to power largely because of the majority of Iranians’ dissatisfaction with their economic and social conditions, and their disappointment with the economic and foreign policy record of President Khatami’s government. Note that despite Khatami’s policy of “Tension Reduction” (Tashanoj Zadaei) and Dialogue of Civilization, and its cooperation with the West in Afghanistan, Iran was branded part of the Axis of Evil.

Despite the fact that because of higher oil prices Ahmadinejad’s government has had more resources than any other post-revolutionary government, Iran’s economy has not made significant progress, nor have the peoples’ conditions improved noticeably. On the contrary, because of a mixture of external pressures, such as economic sanctions, and what some Iranian economists characterize as the government’s inflationary policies, there has been a sharp increase in prices of necessary goods, while there has been no significant dent in the number of unemployed. The election of a large number of Ahmadinejad’s opponents to the parliament would indicate the people’s dissatisfaction with his performance, and thus the fact that his chances of being reelected in 2009 are not good.

Second, the election of a majority of reformist politicians and those who call themselves “Reformist Fundamentalists” (Usul Garayan e Eslahtalab), and include figures such as the mayor of Teheran and former presidential candidate Ghalibaf, would indicate the leadership’s turning a way of Ahmadinejad’s brand of domestic populism and bombastic diplomatic style.

Already, key figures of Iranian Revolution, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose election earlier this year to the presidency of the influential “Assembly of Experts” (Shoraye Khebreghan) indicated a defeat for the arch-conservatives around Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi, have warned about dangers confronting Iran presently. Rafsanjani, in particular, has stressed the necessity of patience and seriousness in the conduct of Iran’s diplomacy, and avoidance of inflammatory language in the current tense regional and international conditions.
Third, in anticipation of these elections there has been an unprecedented effort at coalition building, especially on the part of reformist forces. The goal for each front, which is made of different political parties and groupings, is to come up with a common list of candidates. However, despite some progress in this respect, both the reformist front and the camp of Usul Garayan have not yet come up with a common list.
On the part of the reformists, this is largely due to bad feelings among supporters of the former speaker of Parliament and presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi and those within the reformist camp whom his supporters call the extremists, and hold responsible them responsible for the reformists’ defeat in the 2005 presidential elections.

Karrubi has formed the party “Etemad Melli” (National Trust), which claims to be a social democratic party, within the confines of the system and Imam’s (Khomeini’s) teachings. Meanwhile, the so-called “Moderate Reformists” (Eslahtalaban e Etedal Gera) are gathered within the “Front for National Cooperation” (Jebheh ye Mosharekat e Melli).The Organization of the Fighters for Islamic Revolution (Sazman e- Mojahedin e Englabe e Islami ) represents the most reformist elements in this camp, namely those who are viewed as having gone too far in challenging the existing system, especially the position of the Supreme Leader, and thus having been the main cause of the reformists’ failure in the last parliamentary and presidential elections.

This group, indeed, represents the leftist wing of the movement that brought Muhammad Khatami to presidency in 1997 and fought against forming a coalition of the center with Rafsanjani’s supporters before the 2000 parliamentary elections. They also refused to support Karrubi’s bid for presidency in 2005, and encouraged some of their supporters not to participate in the elections, actions which resulted in Ahmadinejad’s victory.
This is one reason Karrubi, has said that his party will field its own candidates independently, although some of them may also appear in the list of other reformist groups. Nevertheless, other reformists have formed the “Coalition Headquarters of Reformists” (Setad e Etelaf e Eslahtalaban) and are still trying to find a way of coming up with a unified list. Some figures - notably Khatami - are acceptable to both groups. Thus Etemad e Melli has said that if Khatami decides to run for parliament he will lead their list of candidates.

Meanwhile, differences exist between the supporters and detractors of Ahmadinejad within the ranks of the Usul Garayan with the latter claiming to be more reformist; although they too, have formed a coalition front.
Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad has began a second tour of visits to various provinces ostensibly to listen to people’s grievances and check on the progress of promises and commitments made during his first tour of visits, but clearly with an eye to the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Fourth, in this run up to the elections, both sides are focusing on two important issues albeit with varying degrees of emphasis: economy and people’s economic demands; and the need to institutionalize political groups in the form of political parties with clear philosophies and programs. Karrubi has been particularly vocal and active in emphasizing the importance of the creation and consolidation of political parties for Iran’s future democratic evolution and proper governance. Others have noted that people should focus on different parties and groups’ programs rather than personalities who head them.

Fifth, this election is characterized by the greater involvement of women on both sides. The reformist group Jebheh ye Mosharekat Melli has said that thirty percent of its candidates will be women, and the Usul Garayan have their own women’s group.

Amid the pre-election buildup, fears that candidates may be arbitrarily disqualified or elections be tempered with persists. Many key political figures have warned that such developments would lead to people’s loss faith in the system and thus weaken it.

However, thus far, preparations for the forthcoming elections and the ongoing debates both within the reformist camp and that of Usul Garayan indicate that moderate forces within both camps are on the ascendant.
Reformists, after going through a wrenching soul searching and self –criticism, have come to realize that some of their expectations for fundamental and rapid change in the system were unrealistic, and backfired They realize that their approach may have doomed more limited , but steady, movement toward reform.

Meanwhile, the more conservative Usul Garayan have come to realize that management of the country’s affairs , domestic and foreign, requires skills , professionalism and an open mind and not merely commitment to Islam. This point was recently stressed by Tehran’s mayor who belongs to the reformist wing of Usul Garayan.
Therefore, if nothing happens to disrupt the forthcoming elections, or drastically change the country’s conditions, the result is likely to be a moderately reformist parliament. Such a parliament will be better able to get its decisions approved by supervisory bodies, such as the Council of Guardians, and even more importantly by the Supreme Leader.

Should the above development materialize, Iran’s politics and policies may become more predictable, and its debilitating factionalism may gradually evolve into a more mature political pluralism channeled through properly functioning political parties. However, as in the past, this optimistic scenario may become the casualty of another regional or international crisis, including one of Iran’s own making.

The author is a Visiting Professor and former Director of the Carnegie Project on Reformist Islam at the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding.